

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

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TRSE-00 SCEM-01 L-02 SPC-01 NEA-06 IO-03 ACDA-10

DRC-01 PRS-01 SCI-03 /081 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9103

INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRUSSELS 6408

LIMDIS

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEC, XF, BE

SUB: DAVIGNON ON EC-9 MID-EAST DECLARATION, AND OIL SITUATION

1. SUMMARY IN NOVEMBER 9 PRESS BACKGROUNDER, UNUSUAL
IN THAT IT WAS RESTRICTED TO BELGIAN NATIONALS AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OR ATTRIBUTION, POLITICAL DIRECTOR DAVIGNON DISCUSSED THE MID-EAST
AND THE RECENT EC-9 DECLARATION, THE EC OIL SITUATION AND POMPIDOU'S
SUMMIT INITIATIVE. (SEPTTEL) ANY INTIMATION THAT USG IS APPRISED
OF HIS REMARKS WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE SOURCE. END
SUMMARY.

2. MID-EAST AND EC-NINE DECLARATION. DAVIGNON SAID THE
FIRST WAS THAT THE ACTION WAS INGLORIOUS AND REEKED OF OIL.
DAVIGNON SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS, FOR THE DECLARATION WAS
VERY BADLY TIMED AND THE BELGIANS HAD DONE ALL POSSIBLE TO
SECURE AN EARLIER DECLARATION. NEITHER FRANCE NOR ENGLAND
WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, AND THEIR FOOT DRAGGING
HAD ENSURED THAT THE EC COUNTRIES WERE NOT PARTY TO PRESENT
NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHOICE, HOWEVER, WAS EITHER NO DECLARATION
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OR ONE AT A MUCH LATER MOMENT AND THE ARABS HAD FORCED THE

EC TO ACT.

3. THE OTHER TYPE OF REACTION STRESSES THAT THE DECLARATION IS 1) USELESS, 2) REVEALS THE NONEXISTENCE OF EUROPE, AND 3) WAS COMPLETELY UNBALANCED IN FAVOR OF THE ARABS. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST CHARGE, DAVIGNON SAID THAT REACTIONS SHOW THAT THE EC DECLARATION IS BECOMING ONE, ALBEIT NOT THE MAIN, ELEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. FURTHERMORE, IT IS EXPECTED THAT ISRAEL WILL NOW PROVIDE THE EC-NINE WITH A MEMORANDUM ON THEIR POSITION, WHICH WILL OPEN WAY FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE AND PERMIT EUROPE TO PURSUE ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. THE MID-EAST SITUATION, AS THAT IN VIETNAM, HE SAID, HAD MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT NO COUNTRY CAN IMPOSE SOMETHING UPON ANOTHER.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE EXISTENCE OF EUROPE AND THOSE WHO FOUND THE DECLARATION LAMENTABLE IN THAT RESPECT, DAVIGNON REMARKED THAT THOSE WHO HAILED AS REMARKABLE THE MODEST STEPS THE EC-NINE COUNTRIES HAD TAKEN IN THE PASS NOW CHARACTERIZED SIMILAR STEPS AS PITIFUL. IN TRUTH, THE EC COUNTRIES HAD ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL SINCE NOVEMBER 1972 THAT THERETOFORE SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE. SPECIFICALLY, THE US-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WAS UNDERWAY, THE EC-NINE WERE CONCERTING THEIR ACTIONS AT THE UN, EC AMBASSADORS IN ALL OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WERE CONSULTING DAILY, AND THE EC WOULD ACT COLLECTIVELY IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS IN THE FUTURE. A FURTHER IMPORTANT RESULT WAS THAT FRANCE HAD ACCEPTED AN ACCELERATION IN EC-NINE POLITICAL COOPERATION. EUROPE, HE SAID, IS NOT THE US OR THE USSR BUT HAS A ROLE AND A PLACE OF ITS OWN IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF THE DECLARATION, DAVIGNON REJECTED CRITICISM WHICH ALLEGED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER VAN ELSLANDE SIGNED THE DECLARATION SIMPLY TO PLACATE THE ARABS. ANYONE WHO KNOWS VAN ELSLANDE, HE SAID, KNOWS THAT SUCH IS NOT HIS CHARACTER. RATHER, THE DECLARATION IS EQUITABLE AND DESIGNED TO ASSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. FIRST, HE SAID, IT ASKED FOR A RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 POSITIONS.; THIS HAD NOW BEEN SETTLED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND MR. SISCO. THE EC-NINE FORGOT TO MENTION THE BEL MAN DEB STRAITS PROBLEM SIMPLY

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BECAUSE THEIR INFORMATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT ASKED FOR ITS INCLUSION. (ASKED HOW ISREAL HAD BEEN KEPT INFORMED, DAVIGNON SAID THAT BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE EC-NINE MEETINGS, HE MET TWO TIMES DAILY WITH AMBASSADOR ALON.) NEXT, THE EC DECLARATION ASKED FOR CEASE FIRE AND FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL (HE EMPHASIZED ALL) ITS PARTS. THE EC COUNTRIES WANTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED

NATIONS BECAUSE, UNLIKE THE VIETNAM CASE, THEY DO NOT WANT AGREEMENTS TO BE LAID BEFORE THE MOST INTERESTED PARTIES SIMPLY FOR RUBBER STAMPING. THIRD, THE EC DECLARATION EMPHASIZED THE ULTIMATE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE. REFERENCE TO THE INADMISSIBILITY OF RETENTION OF CONQUERED TERRITORIES WAS A WAY TO CIRCUMVENT ARAB INSISTENCE ON WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS AND ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON NEGOTIATING WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR OCCUPATION. THE EC COUNTRIES, DAVIGNON SAID, BELIEVE THAT THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 MUST BE RESTORED TO THE ARABS AND THE 1967 FRONTIERS MAINTAINED WITH ONLY MINOR CORRECTIONS AND BY APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES. FINALLY, THE EC COUNTRIES BELIEVE THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT. IN THIS RESPECT HE ADMITTED THAT EC DECLARATION WENT BEYOND SCURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, BUT HE CLAIMED EVEN ISRAEL HAD TALKED OF CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE JORDAN'S WEST BANK. DAVIGNON SAID NOTHING IN THE EC DECLARATION THEREFORE GIVES ISRAEL ANY REASON TO COMPLAIN ABOUT IT NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS SAID WITHOUT REFERENCE AT ALL TO THE DECLARATION'S FINAL PARAGRAPH WHICH OFFERED COOPERATION TO ISRAELIS AND TO ARABS ALIKE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9104

INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRUSSELS 6408

LIMDIS

6. DAVIGNON SAID THAT SOLUTION OF THE MID-EAST PROBLEM SHOULD INCLUDE DEMILITARIZED ZONES IN BOTH THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AREA AND THE SINAI. IT WAS TOO MUCH TO EXPECT, WITH ANIMOSITIES ROOTED IN CENTURIES OF HOSTILITIES, THAT ARABS AND ISRAELIS CONFRONTING EACH OTHER ACROSS FRONTIERS WOULD NOT FIGHT; THEREFORE, THERE MUST BE AN INTERPOSING FORCE, PREPARED TO FIGHT IF NECESSARY, AND OPERATING UNDER UNSC MANDATE. ONLY THEN, HE SAID, WOULD THERE BE A REAL POLITICAL COMMITMENT, ONE THAT COULD NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SUBJECT TO VETO.

7. EC OIL SITUATION. DAVIGNON SAID THAT WHILE OIL SHORTAGES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE EC COUNCIL, THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS THE ENORMOUS DIPLOMATIC ERROR OF THE DUTCH IN RAISING THE MATTER PUBLICLY. NO ONE IN THE EC HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF TAKING ACTION TO RESTRICT THE FREE MOVEMENT OF OIL WITHIN THE EC AND HE THOUGHT NO ONE WOULD. HE NOTED THAT BELGIUM RECEIVED OVER 60 PERCENT OF ITS OIL FROM ROTTERDAM BUT HAD NOT ASKED EITHER THE BRITISH OR THE FRENCH FOR HELP. RATHER, BELGIUM EXPECTS THEM TO ACT WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF ROME, TO ASK THEM TO DO SO WOULD BE TACTLESS.

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8. FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, DAVIGNON SAID, STILL LABORED UNDER SOME DELUSIONS OF THEIR PAST GLORIES, BUT EVEN FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT HAD ADMITTED BEFORE THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE EC-NINE HAD ACHIEVED THINGS THAT FRANCE ALONE COULD NOT. THEN, ALLUDING TO THE BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE FINAL DECLARATION BY THE EC-NINE MINISTERS AND CLAIMS THAT FRENCH VIEWS HAD PREVAILED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE FRENCH HAD INSISTED UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR'S RECOMMENDATION, DAVIGNON SAID HE WAS SICK OF SUCH INTERPRETATIONS. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS HAD BEGUN WITH A DRAFT THAT INCLUDED ONLY PART OF PARAGRAPH TWO AND PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE FINAL DECLARATION, AND THE FRENCH HAD MOVED FAR FROM THEIR PAST POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARABS. HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH COUNTRIES HAD PRESSED FOR WHAT IN THE EXPANDED DECLARATION, BUT HE NOTED THAT THE IRISH HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH AS A SINGLE COMMA; NEVERTHELESS, THE DECLARATION WAS AS MUCH A CREDIT TO THE IRISH AS THE OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED. HE SAID THE WORK WAS DONE BY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, AND HE GAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CHIEF DE CABINET, NOTERAE ME CREDIT FOR MOST OF IT. STRAUSS-HUPE

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